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Rearranging the Roles of the Performer and the Composer in the Music Industry – the 
Potential Significance of Fisher v Brooker 
 
Introduction 
 
The composer has historically been at the top of the tree in the music industry; most royalties 
due to artists flow back to composers/songwriters rather than performers. Over the last few 
decades, the enactment of stronger performers‟ rights has sought to redress this historical 
imbalance by providing performers with, amongst a number of economic and moral rights, 
the right to receive equitable remuneration for the exploitation and use of their performances. 
However, this article explores the fact that there may be cases where performers may be 
„authors‟ for the purpose of copyright, as opposed to performers‟ rights. Some original works 
of joint authorship – musical arrangements – may not have been traditionally recognised as 
such within the music industry. For instance, with regard to the making of arrangements by a 
group of musicians, it appears from recent UK case law that as long as a performing musician 
makes an original contribution to the creation of an arrangement, he or she will be a joint 
author of the resulting work. As a result of this, the performing musician is deserving of a 
share of copyright in that arrangement, and by analogy, a share of licensing revenue from the 
exploitation of the arrangement. However, this conclusion appears to be slightly at odds with 
historical practices within the music industry. Furthermore, this raises further a question 
concerning whether it ought to be the case that performers are potentially seen as joint 
authors in return for their creative contributions.  
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In order to assess these issues in detail, this article first outlines the concept of the musical 
work under the CDPA, including analysis of the distinction between the composition and the 
arrangement. The article also discusses the historical hierarchy of musicians in the music 
industry, exploring the reasons why the composer of the work has traditional received more 
royalties than the performer of the work. An assessment of the originality of compositions 
and arrangements is also detailed over the course of this article. Furthermore, in order to 
properly assess the issues, the important UK cases in this area are examined, with a particular 
focus on the case of Fisher v Brooker, a case which clarifies to some degree the law on the 
making of musical arrangements, and which also deals with the complex licensing issues that 
can arise from finding that a band member is in fact a joint author of a recorded arrangement.  
 
Ultimately, this article argues that the law on authorship and joint authorship in this area is 
clear - any musician who adds sufficient creative originality to a musical work during the 
performance and recording process is a joint author of the resulting arrangement. However, 
although the law is clear, the traditional practices of the music industry may not take account 
of this. For this reason, it is important that musicians in groups place their legal relationship 
to each other, and the works they create, in writing before they begin the artistic process. 
 
Assessing the Nature of the Musical Work under the CDPA – Compositions and 
Arrangements 
 
This article primarily focuses on copyright law issues in relation to musical works and the 
authorship and ownership of these works. Within the music industry, the copyright in the 
original musical work, which is sometimes referred to as copyright in the musical 
„composition‟, is often a highly valuable copyright.2 However, with respect to musical works, 
the copyright in the composition is not the only potentially significant copyright; in addition 
to the copyright in the original musical composition there may also be copyright in a 
subsequent original „arrangement‟ of that composition. Before the issues of authorship, 
ownership and licensing can be examined in this article, it is first necessary to undertake an 
analysis of the distinction between these two different types of musical work. Moreover, 
before the distinction between these two distinct musical works can be properly assessed, it is 
necessary to discuss the definition of „musical work‟ under UK law. 
 
It is generally acknowledged that what amounts to a piece of „music‟ is undoubtedly difficult, 
and perhaps impossible, to define.
3
 Regarding the definition of „music‟ for the purposes of 
copyright law, it has been stated that a „reasonably liberal interpretation is called for‟.4 In line 
with this, Rahmatian has remarked that it is „wise‟ that the legislature did not attempt to 
define „music‟ when enacting the CDPA.5 As detailed below, it is clear that the UK courts 
take a broad interpretation of what amounts to „music‟ and what is encompassed by the 
„musical work‟. 
 
                                                             
2 See discussion of this copyright at „PRS for Music‟, one of the major copyright collecting societies; accessible 
at http://www.prsformusic.com/aboutus/pages/default.aspx  
3 C. L. Saw, „Protecting the sound of silence in 4`33`` - a timely revisit of basic principles in copyright law,‟ 
European Intellectual Property Review 27(12) (2005), 467, 469. 
4 Laddie also remarked that an original musical work is usually „a combination of sounds appreciated by the ear 
for reasons other than linguistic content‟. H. Laddie, P. Prescott and M. Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright 
and Designs (3rd ed.), (London: Butterworths, 2000), 79. 
5 A. Rahmatian, „Music and Creativity as Perceived by Copyright Law,‟ Intellectual Property Quarterly 3 
(2005), 267, 268.  
The Court of Appeal decision in Sawkins v Hyperion
6
 is the most recent, authoritative 
decision on the nature of the musical work under the CDPA. In Sawkins, the claimant 
successfully argued that he owned the copyright in performing editions that he had prepared 
of public domain works originally composed by Michel-Richard Lalande. In this case, 
Mummery L.J. stated that „the essence of music is combining sounds for listening to‟.7 
Mummery L.J. also remarked: 
 
“Music is not the same as mere noise. The sound of music is intended to produce effects of 
some kind on the listener‟s emotions and intellect. The sounds may be produced by an 
organised performance on instruments played from a musical score, though that is not 
essential for the existence of the music or of copyright in it... There is no reason why, for 
example, a recording of a person‟s spontaneous singing, whistling or humming or 
improvisations of sounds by a group of people with or without musical instruments should 
not be regarded as „music‟ for copyright purposes.”8 
 
It is clear that this notion of music is broad
9
; it is not limited to harmony or melody. 
Mummery L.J. further stated that it would be incorrect to „single out the notes as uniquely 
                                                             
6 Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 565; [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3281. 
7 Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3281, para. 53. 
8 Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3281, para. 53. 
9 L. Bently, „Authorship of Popular Music under Copyright Law‟ Information, Communication and Society 
12(2) (2009), 179, 184. S. Ricketson and J. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights- The 
Berne Convention and Beyond (2nd ed.), (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 426 and J. Pila, „Copyright 
and its Categories of Original Works,‟ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30(2) (2010), 229, 236-242. For further 
discussion of this point see A. Barron, „Copyright Law‟s Musical Work,‟ Social and Legal Studies 15(1) (2006), 
101, 105-106 and 123-4. 
significant for copyright purposes and to proceed to deny copyright to the other elements that 
make some contribution to the sound of the music when performed, such as performing 
indications, tempo and performance practice indicators‟.10 Therefore, it is clear that the 
„musical work‟ under the CDPA can encompass not only notes of music, but also other 
elements of musical practice and performance. Nonetheless, in Coffey v Warner
11
, it was held 
that a musical work cannot exist where it consists of mere „extractions‟ from another work. 
Thus, to exist as a musical work in itself
12
, a smaller work must be separable from a larger 
work.  
 
Originality of Musical Works - Compositions 
 
Under the CDPA, in addition to the requirement of fixation
13
, the requirement of originality is 
must be satisfied before a musical work is protected under copyright law.
14
 A composition 
                                                             
10 Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3281, para. 56. 
11 Coffey v Warner/Chappell Music [2005] FSR (34) 747.  
12 A song lyric is protected separately from an accompanying musical work. CDPA s 3(1) states that a literary 
work „means any work, other than a dramatic or musical work, which is written, spoken or sung‟. In addition, it 
has been noted that even though the human voice is an instrument, sung lyrics are not part of the musical work. 
Peter Hayes v Phonogram Ltd [2003] ECDR 110, see views of Blackburne J. 
13 CDPA s 3(2). Fixation is a basic requirement for copyright protection in the UK. See Merchandising 
Corporation of America Inc v Harpbond Inc [1983] FSR 32. The musical work must be fixed in a tangible form 
for copyright to subsist; until a melody is recorded or written down, it will not have copyright protection . 
Nonetheless, it has been held that a „musical work‟ can exist before it is „fixed‟ , as noted by Park J. in Hadley v 
Kemp [1999] E.M.L.R. 589.  As Mummery L.J.. stated in in Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 
565, at para. 53, it is necessary that music be „distinguished from the fact and the form of its fixation as a record 
of a musical composition... fixation in the written score or on a record is not itself the music in which copyright 
subsists‟. 
will only be protected as a musical work to the extent that it is sufficiently original. As 
discussed below, following the Infopaq
15
 judgment of the European Court of Justice, it has 
been argued that the originality standard has now been effectively harmonised in the EU, 
which has potential significance for copyright in the UK.
16
 On the other hand, even if this is 
the case, the traditional UK view of originality, as based upon „origination‟ and „skill, 
judgment and labour‟ may still be of relevance. With respect to the traditional view, Peterson 
J. stated in University of London Press v University Tutorial Press
17
: 
 
“The originality which is required relates to the expression of thought. But the Act does not 
require that the expression be in an original or novel form, but that the work must not be 
copied from another work – that it should originate from the author”.18 
 
It appears from Peterson J.‟s remarks that the traditional view of „originality‟ in UK 
copyright law is broadly defined.
19
 In line with this, it has been noted that it is not necessary 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
14 CDPA s 1(1)(a).  
15 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08) [2009] ECDR 16. 
16 E. Declaye, „Wonderful or Worrisome? The Impact of the ECJ Ruling in Infopaq on UK Copyright Law,‟ 
European Intellectual Property Review 5 (2010), 247. C. Handig, „Infopaq International A/S v Danske 
Dagblades Forening (C-5/08): is the term "work" of the CDPA 1988 in line with the European Directives?‟ 
European Intellectual Property Review 32(2) (2010), 53. 
17 University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 601. 
18 University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 601, at 608-609. This case was 
cited in Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 273 by Reid J. at 277.  
19 With respect to Peterson J.‟s remark on the notion of „expression of thought‟, the idea/expression dichotomy 
was discussed in the case of LB (Plastics Ltd v Swish Products Ltd [1979] RPC 551 at 619, 633, where it was 
noted that it is original skill in expression, rather than thought, that is protected by copyright. However, there is 
no mention of „idea/expression‟ dichotomy in the CDPA. For further discussion see H. Laddie, P. Prescott and 
that work be „unprecedented‟.20 Indeed, the threshold for originality has traditionally not been 
high.
21
 In Ladbroke v William Hill
22, Lord Reid noted that „skill, judgment and labour‟ on the 
part of the author are the necessary requirements for establishing originality.
23
 
 
At this point, it must be stated that the ECJ judgment in Infopaq
24
 appears to point towards 
using the notion of „intellectual creation‟ as a standard of originality for all copyright works 
within the EU. Previous to this case, this standard was mainly of significance in the UK as 
the standard for computer programs/databases following the coming into effect of the EU 
Information Society Directive.
25
 However, this standard of „intellectual creation‟ is now 
potentially of great importance in relation to originality of musical works under copyright in 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
M. Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (3rd ed.), (London: Butterworths, 2000), 98 and W. 
Cornish, D. Llewelyn and T. Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights 
(7th ed.), (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2010), 448.  
20 H. Laddie, P. Prescott and M. Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (3rd ed.), (London: 
Butterworths, 2000), 84. 
21 Redwood Music Ltd v Chappell & Co Ltd [1982] RPC 109 (QBD). See also Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd 
[2005] 1 W.L.R. 3281. 
22 Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 273. 
23 Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 273, 278. This principle of copyright 
protection, as founded upon the skill and labour of the author in creating the work, was further reflected in the 
court‟s decision in Designers Guild Limited v Russell Williams (Textiles) Limited [2001] FSR 113. However, not 
every case that features „skill and labour‟ has resulted in a copyright work. See also Exxon Corporation v Exxon 
Insurance Consultants [1982] RPC 69, where it was held that despite skill and labour expounded, one word 
could not amount to a literary work. 
24 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08) [2009] ECDR 16. 
25 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Official Journal L 167, 22/06/2001; 
accessible at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0029:EN:HTML  
the UK. To some commentators this presents a challenge to the standard of originality as it is 
applied in the national courts of the EU, including the courts of the UK.
26
 In this view, the 
traditional Ladbroke requirements of „skill, judgment and labour‟ have seemingly been 
replaced with a requirement based on the notion of „intellectual creation‟. Indeed, Handig has 
argued that the harmonised Infopaq standard is probably higher than the previous UK 
standard under the CDPA.
27
  
 
Furthermore, in the recent case of Newspaper Licensing Agency v Meltwater
28
 the Court of 
Appeal upheld the ruling of Proudman J. in the High Court that the Infopaq test of intellectual 
creation was the test for originality in the UK. However, the Court of Appeal argued that this 
was not a change to the classic idea of originality under UK law, as expressed in the case of 
University of London Press v University Tutorial Press
29
, as being based on the idea of the 
work „originating‟ with the author. In other words, the Court of Appeal was of the opinion 
that Infopaq did not change the standard of originality under UK copyright with regard to 
issues of requisite merit or novelty.
30
 
 
                                                             
26 E. Declaye, „Wonderful or Worrisome? The Impact of the ECJ Ruling in Infopaq on UK Copyright Law,‟ 
European Intellectual Property Review 5 (2010), 247, 248. C. Handig, „Infopaq International A/S v Danske 
Dagblades Forening (C-5/08): is the term "work" of the CDPA 1988 in line with the European Directives?‟ 
European Intellectual Property Review 32(2) (2010), 53, 56.  
27 C. Handig, „Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08): is the term "work" of the 
CDPA 1988 in line with the European Directives?‟ European Intellectual Property Review 32(2) (2010), 53, 56. 
28 Newspaper Licensing Agency v Meltwater [2011] EWCA Civ 890; see also High Court of Newspaper 
Licensing Agency v Meltwater [2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch). 
29 University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 601. 
30 It is interesting to note, however, made no reference to „skill, judgment and labour‟, despite the fact that 
Ladbroke was cited in the judgment. Newspaper Licensing Agency v Meltwater [2011] EWCA Civ 890 para. 19. 
Nonetheless, even if the standard of originality had been changed by Infopaq, this may have 
had little relevance to the originality standard with respect to musical works. On this point 
Derclaye has remarked that the standard of intellectual creation merely illustrates that 
„creativity is the criterion of originality‟.31 Therefore, with respect to the originality of 
musical works even if the originality standard had been altered by Infopaq, the classic 
understanding of originality, as discussed in Sawkins
32
, would arguably still be highly 
relevant since, as Declaye has stated, it is arguable that most, if not all, „musical works‟ can 
be described as „creative‟ to some extent.33  
 
Originality of Musical Works - Arrangements 
 
As noted above, analysis of the distinction between the „composition‟ and the „arrangement‟ 
is of vital importance to this article. In line with this, it is clear that under the CDPA a 
separate copyright can exist in an „arrangement‟ of a composition as long as the arrangement 
                                                             
31 E. Declaye, „Wonderful or Worrisome? The Impact of the ECJ Ruling in Infopaq on UK Copyright Law,‟ 
European Intellectual Property Review 5 (2010), 247, 248. 
32 Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] 1 W.L.R. 328 at para. 28-36. For an assessment of this aspect of the 
case see A. Rahmatian, „The Concepts of 'Musical Work' and 'Originality' in UK Copyright Law - Sawkins v. 
Hyperion as a Test Case,‟ International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 40 (5), 560. 
33 E. Declaye, „Wonderful or Worrisome? The Impact of the ECJ Ruling in Infopaq on UK Copyright Law,‟ 
European Intellectual Property Review 5 (2010), 247, 249. Furthermore, if one takes the „intentional view‟ 
advocated by J. Pila, „An Intentional View of the Copyright Work,‟ Modern Law Review 71 (2008), 535, then if 
one intends to create a musical work and it accords with the broad Sawkins definition, then this arguably shows 
sufficient intellectual creativity to satisfy the Infopaq standard with respect to musical works. It is arguable that 
Dr. Sawkins did intend to create a musical work in the form of a performing edition that could be played by 
modern performers. In addition, the process of editing and filling in the gaps in the musical score was arguably 
an example of „intellectual creativity‟. 
is sufficiently original
34
 and the requisite originality comes from the arranger.
35
 The owner of 
the original copyright in the composition is not the owner of the new arrangement copyright, 
which vests in the arranger.
36
 The arranger has the same ownership rights under copyright 
over his or her arrangement as the composer has in relation to his or her composition, with 
the caveat that the arrangement would require a license for the use of the underlying 
composition. It is clear, therefore, that potentially copyright can recognise rights in multiple 
arrangements of the same composition.
37
  
 
With respect to originality, it can be said that the same low threshold of „originality‟ is 
sufficient in relation to answering the question of whether an adaptation of a work results in a 
                                                             
34 Austin v Columbia [1917-1923] Mac. CC 398. See also Robertson v Lewis [1976] RPC 169. Further see Lover 
v Davidson (1856) 1 CBNS 182 (involving musical accompaniment to an old air) and Wood v Boosey (1868) LR 
3 QB 223 (involving an operatic pianoforte score). In line with this, Arnold has remarked that it is clear that 
very little is actually required on the part of the arranger „by way of changes to an antecedent musical work‟ for 
the arrangement to be sufficiently „original, and thus capable of attracting a fresh copyright‟. R. Arnold, 
„Reflections on “The Triumph of Music”: Copyrights and Performers‟ Rights in Music,‟ Intellectual Property 
Quarterly 2 (2010), 153, 158. See also L. Abramson and T. Bamford of Harbottle & Lewis in the June 2008 
edition of The In-House Lawyer, 42; accessible at 
http://www.harbottle.com/hnl/upload/documents/Music%20Copyright.pdf.  
35 Redwood Music Ltd v Chappell & Co Ltd [1982] RPC 109 (QBD). However a straightforward „cover‟ of a 
work may lack sufficient originality. On this point see also comments of Lewison J. in section 6 of „Copyright 
Claims‟ in Aston Barrett v. Universal Island Rec. Ltd [2006] EWHC 1009 (Ch). 
36 This would usually be the case unless an alternative has been agreed between the two parties.  
37 It must be noted that the effective use of this copyright is subject to licensing requirements and the copyright 
in the new arrangement does not replace or nullify the copyright in the underlying work. An arranger of a 
copyright work must have obtained a licence from the owner of the underlying copyright work in order to 
release and publish the new arrangement because the right to make „adaptations‟ is one of the rights of the 
copyright owner, as is clear from CDPA s 21. 
new copyright work i.e. a new, original „arrangement‟ of the antecedent compositional 
work.
38
 Nevertheless, where the distinction between two different musical works i.e. the 
„composition‟ and the „arrangement‟ has not been clearly maintained, potential difficulties 
may arise, particularly in relation to cases involving joint authorship of musical arrangements 
and any related subsequent licensing disputes. In order to assess the significance of licensing 
in this context, it is necessary to discuss the various rights that apply to „composers‟ and 
„performers‟ in the context of the music industry, as well as to briefly outline the way 
composers and performers earn royalties from the exploitation of these rights. 
 
Comparing the Positions of the Composer and the Performer in the Music Industry 
 
During the 20th century, the music industry expanded rapidly. Indeed, by the end of the 
1990s, the global music industry was a huge part of the world economy.
39
 There is little doubt 
that the commercialisation of music, and the consequent expansion of the music industry over 
the course of the 20th century, could not have occurred without the enactment and 
enforcement of copyright law.
40
 The music industry still largely operates on the basis that the 
                                                             
38 Redwood Music Ltd v Chappell & Co Ltd [1982] RPC 109 (QBD). See also Aston Barrett v. Universal Island 
Rec. Ltd [2006] EWHC 1009 (Ch), comments of Lewison J. at para. 10 of the „Copyright Claims‟ section. This 
standard would arguably satisfy the Infopaq „intellectual creation‟ standard since the making of musical 
arrangements requires some degree of creativity. 
39 The peak year of global recorded music sales was 1996, with a figure of approximately US $39 billion in 
sales; accessible at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3622285.stm - See further G. Lopes and K. Jopling 
(eds.), The Recording Industry in Numbers (London: IFPI, 2003). 
40 For instance, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission noted in 1994 that copyright is vital for the music 
industry; see generally Monopolies and Mergers Commission, The Supply of Recorded Music: A Report by the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission on the Supply in the UK of Pre-recorded Compact Discs, Vinyl Discs and 
Tapes Containing Music Cm 2599 (London: HMSO, 1994); accessible at http://www.competition-
first owner of copyright in the musical work and/or the sound recording will assign, or 
license, the relevant economic rights to a publisher, record company, and/or collecting 
society for the purpose of exploitation. In particular, the role of the „collecting societies‟ is 
crucial to music licensing. There are a number of music collecting societies operating within 
the UK and Ireland. These organisations collect and distribute copyright royalties on behalf 
of composers, performers and record companies.
41
 For present purposes the important 
composers‟ collecting societies in the UK are the Mechanical Copyright Protection Society 
(MCPS) and the Performing Rights Society (PRS). „PRS for Music‟ is the umbrella 
organisation that represents the interests of both PRS and MCPS.
42
 These organisations 
operate in the UK, but generally these organisations maintain reciprocal agreements with 
equivalent organisations in other states.
43
  
 
The composer, or in a pop band context, the „songwriter‟, is typically the author of the 
original musical work.
44
 By way of assignment or licence, a composer can either register a 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1994/356recordedmusic.htm#full 
41 It is generally acknowledged that SACEM in France in 1851 was the first composers‟ collecting agency. R. 
Wallis, „Copyright and Composers‟ in S. Frith and L. Marshall (eds.), Music and Copyright (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2005, 2nd ed.), 103, 103. 
42 http://www.prsformusic.com/Pages/default.aspx 
43 K. Garnett, G. Davies and G. Harbottle, Copinger and Skone James on the Law of Copyright (London: Sweet 
& Maxwell Ltd, 2010, 16th ed.), 1656. It is noted that while „public performance and national broadcast rights‟ 
would normally be licensed „from the society in which the public performance or broadcast takes place, 
collecting societies (particularly within the EU) compete with each other to offer favourable terms to the major 
international record companies for reproduction rights‟ therefore a record company can choose to deal with only 
one EU society for all of its EU „manufacturing licences‟. 
44 Nevertheless, it has been said that the composer has traditionally been in a „vulnerable‟ position within the 
music industry. R. Wallis, „Copyright and the Composer,‟ in S. Frith and L. Marshall (eds.), Music and 
composition with a collecting society or sign with a publisher „who then retains a share of the 
revenues in return for assistance in promoting the work‟.45 Licensing is one of the primary 
ways that composers can earn money in the music industry. For example, although a large 
amount of music industry income is generated from the „exploitation of recordings of 
performances of musical compositions‟, composers often earn more than performers.46 In 
addition, a composer will receive two possible streams of royalty income; one based on 
mechanical royalties, via MCPS, and one based on performance royalties, via PRS. It may be 
the case that a performer will only receive one stream, as discussed below.
47
 
 
Indeed, it is partially due to the rationale that copyright should reward authors, i.e. 
composers, that performers were traditionally given very few rights under copyright. This is 
no longer the case. During the last two decades performers‟ rights have been gradually 
expanded.
48
 Of particular importance is the fact that performers are entitled to „equitable 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Copyright (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 103. 
45 R. Wallis, „Copyright and the Composer,‟ in S. Frith and L. Marshall (eds.), Music and Copyright (Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 104. 
46 N. Parker, „A Raw Deal for Performers: Part 1 – Term of Copyright,‟ Entertainment Law Review 17(6) (2006), 
161, 161. 
47 The exact terms of the performer‟s contract will depend on the circumstances. J. Barnard, „Performers Rights‟ 
(October 2005); article accessible at http://www.musiclawupdates.com/wp-content/uploads/pdf-articles/Article-
Performers_Rights.pdf. 
48Rome Copyright Convention (1928); Accessible at 
http://www.efc.ca/pages/law/canada/rome.copyright.1928.html 
Dramatic and Musical Performers’ Protection Act, 1958; accessible at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1958/pdf/ukpga_19580044_en.pdf 
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations, 1961(hereafter known as the „Rome Convention‟); accessible at 
remuneration‟ when their performances are broadcast or played on radio. The collecting 
society that distributes the „equitable remuneration‟ to performers is Phonographic 
Performance Limited (PPL).
49
 
 
Nonetheless, it has been noted that while the strength of performers‟ rights has increased over 
the last few decades, performers do not have equivalent rights to composers.
50
 Furthermore, 
session musicians are commonly asked to sign a consent form detailing the limits of their 
rights over the works on which they perform, which is usually authorised by the Musician‟s 
Union or an equivalent union.
51
 For this reason, a session musician will generally only be 
given a one off performance fee rather than a royalty over the recording.
52
 Nonetheless, the 
CDPA
53
 provides performers with the right to „equitable remuneration‟ when sound 
recordings of their performances are broadcast e.g. on radio.
54
 Depending on their record 
contracts, high profile performers may receive other income streams as well. Furthermore, 
performers, even if they are not composers, can still potentially earn large sums of money 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/rome/trtdocs_wo024.html 
Performances (Moral Rights) Regulations, 2006; accessible at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2006/20060018.htm 
49 http://www.ppluk.com/ 
50 R. Arnold, „Are Performers Authors? Hadley v Kemp,‟ European Intellectual Property Review 21(9)(1999), 
464, 464-465. 
51 N. Parker, „A Raw Deal for Performers: Part 1 – Term of Copyright,‟ Entertainment Law Review 17(6) (2006), 
161, 163. 
52N. Parker, „A Raw Deal for Performers: Part 1 – Term of Copyright,‟ Entertainment Law Review 17(6) (2006), 
161, 163. 
53 This is the case following the 1996 and 2003 Regulations which amended the CDPA; accessible at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1996/2967/contents/made;   
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/2498/contents/made  
54 CDPA s 182CA . A performer also holds an „equitable remuneration‟ right for „rental‟. CDPA s 191G. 
within the music industry, though a substantial portion of this income often comes from 
earnings arising from live gigs. Nevertheless, it must be noted that even in the case of a 
performer who produces a unique and transcendent performance of a composition, the 
performer will still be required to pay a licensing fee to the composer of the work.  
 
For the purposes of this article, it is also necessary to consider the position of a musical 
„arranger‟ under copyright.55 As noted above, copyright in an „arrangement‟ can exist 
separately to the copyright in the underlying musical composition. In many types of music, 
„arrangers‟ are often simultaneously the composers and/or performers of works, and thus, 
they sometimes do not claim a separate „arrangement‟ copyright for their own released 
version of the composition, as this is arguably unnecessary. Nonetheless, in the case of joint 
authorship, maintaining a clearer demarcation between composition and „arrangement‟ 
copyright could actually help to resolve some disputes. In addition, in certain forms of music 
such as blues, jazz and other forms of traditional music, it is quite common to claim copyright 
in the arrangement of a public domain work or a copyright work.
56
 Further to this, in the pop 
music world there are some well known arrangers, such as Nelson Riddle, who are not major 
songwriters or performers, but are skilled arrangers.
57
  
 
                                                             
55 See - 
http://www.prsformusic.com/creators/memberresources/how_it_works/arrangements/pages/arrangements.aspx 
56 As noted above, where copyright is claimed over an arrangement of a copyright work, a licence will have to 
be paid to the owner of the copyright in the underlying work, and respect to moral rights should normally be 
made. 
57 http://www.nelsonriddlemusic.com/nr_bio.htm ; http://www.amazon.com/September-Rain-Life-Nelson-
Riddle/dp/0823076725  
For the purposes of this article, it is notable that „performers‟ can sometimes also be 
„arrangers‟. However, if a performer is credited as the author of a particular arrangement, and 
this arrangement is then covered by another artist, the performer would rely on the rules of 
authorship under copyright, rather than performers‟ rights, in order to secure a licence for use 
of the arrangement. Crucially, due to the fact that a composition is often created by one 
songwriter, but the final released version is performed by a full band in the studio, it is 
possible that a legal dispute can arise, subsequent to the creation of a musical arrangement, 
about the authorship and ownership of that arrangement. If the arrangement is highly 
valuable, in terms of the potential for generating licensing revenue, this might provide an 
incentive to bring a case before the courts. In fact, as discussed below, a number of cases in 
this area have occurred along these lines in the UK.  
 
Exploring the Distinction between the Composition and the Arrangement in UK Case 
Law 
 
There have been a number of UK cases where a particular copyright arrangement has been 
the subject of a legal dispute. For instance, as outlined below, in both Godfrey v Lees
58
 and 
Beckingham v Hodgens
59
 the disputes centred on the joint authorship of the particular 
copyright arrangements in question. One reason that these kinds of disputes can occur many 
years subsequent to the recording and release of the musical work is that it is sometimes the 
case that the band members or musicians involved in the creation of the work did not discuss 
or come to an agreement regarding the distribution of rights in the work before they entered 
the recording studio. Furthermore, once a distinction is made by courts between an 
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arrangement and an underlying work, previously unforeseen licensing complications may 
arise. As previously stated, the relevant issues of joint authorship are not considered in detail 
in this article. However, for the purposes of this article is necessary to note a number of 
issues concerning the cases and the particular arrangements in question. 
 
In Godfrey v Lees, the dispute concerned the copyright in recorded „arrangements‟ of a 
number of songs by the band Barclay James Harvest. The producer of the band had 
contributed string arrangements and other musical elements to the eventual released versions 
of the songs i.e. the musical works in question. The copyrights in the arrangements were 
correctly identified as being distinct from the copyright in the underlying works and the 
producer was awarded a share of joint authorship in the arrangements. However, the producer 
was estopped from claiming royalties as the court held that he had impliedly given a 
gratuitous licence to the defendants regarding the works in question. 
 
In Beckingham v Hodgens, the dispute concerned the well known version of the song „Young 
At Heart‟ released by the band „The Bluebells‟. The work in question was again recognised 
as an arrangement of the underlying work. It was found that the session musician, a violinist 
known as „Bobby Valentino‟, had contributed the famous violin „hook‟ to the arrangement. 
The court stated that he was entitled to be rewarded with a share in the joint authorship of the 
arrangement. Furthermore, unlike in Godfrey, the joint author in Beckingham was not 
prevented by the court from claiming royalties. 
 
Despite the clarity found on these issues in the above judgments, it appears that when musical 
works are first composed and recorded, the distinction between the underlying work and the 
recorded arrangement of that work can often blur. It is further arguable that courts have 
sometimes found it difficult to clarify the distinction. For instance, in Hadley v Kemp
60
, a 
number of the band members of „Spandau Ballet‟ took a case against a fellow band member 
Gary Kemp, arguing for a share in the copyright of a number of Spandau Ballet songs. Gary 
Kemp was the principal songwriter of the group. He wrote the lyrics, chords and basic 
melody to the song „True‟, which was one of the group‟s biggest hits, and one of the works 
under dispute. One of the disputes over the song concerned its famous saxophone solo, which 
was played by Steve Norman, a band member. The solo lasted for 16 bars, approximately 9% 
of the song. Norman devised this solo around the chords that Kemp presented to him. The 
court ultimately held that the creation of the solo was not a „significant and original 
contribution‟ to the work. Analysis of this notion of „significant and original‟ with regard to 
joint authorship is not the subject of this article. For the purposes of this article it is 
interesting to note that with regard to the actual „musical work‟ at issue in Hadley it is unclear 
as to whether the musical work, as composed and recorded in „demo‟ form by Gary Kemp, 
was the same „work‟ as the eventual version of „True‟, as recorded by the entire band, or 
whether the eventual band recording was an original „arrangement‟ of Kemp‟s composition.61 
Furthermore, Park J. did not make such a distinction in his judgment, which may indicate that 
the other band members were „claiming co-authorship of the works themselves‟.62 Arnold has 
argued that either outcome could have been possible, had it been fully considered by the 
court.
63
 It has further been noted that „in assessing claims to co-authorship of musical works, 
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Intellectual Property Quarterly 2 (2010), 153, 159. 
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the vital first step is for the court correctly to identify the work the subject of the claim to 
copyright and to distinguish it from any antecedent work‟.64 The fact that the court failed to 
do so arguably makes the judgement problematic
65
. Nevertheless, it has been stated that the 
judgment of the High Court in Fisher v Brooker,
66
 the facts of which are broadly comparable 
with Hadley, did resolve some of these difficulties, particularly with regard to recognising 
joint authorship of arrangements among bandmembers.
67
 This important case is discussed in 
detail below. 
 
Fisher v Brooker in the High Court – Recognition of a Work but not an Arrangement? 
 
In Fisher, the facts were similar in some respects to the Hadley case. In this case the 
circumstances surrounding the authorship of the famous song „A Whiter Shade of Pale‟ were 
in dispute. This song became a huge hit in the 1960s, and it remains commercially valuable 
today, due in no small part to its popularity in the market for „ringtones‟. Gary Brooker had 
always been credited with the copyright in the musical work because he wrote the chords and 
melody of the song. The song lyric, protected under the CDPA as a literary work, was 
authored by Keith Reid. According to Gary Brooker, this basic version was originally 
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recorded as a bare „demo‟. This „demo‟ version, referred to by Blackburne J. as „the Song‟, 
was presented to the other band members, who then performed on the final recorded and 
released track „A Whiter Shade of Pale‟, referred to by Blackburne J. as „the Work‟.  
 
„A Whiter Shade of Pale‟ is perhaps most famous for its organ instrumental sections, which 
were created by band member Matthew Fisher during the performance and recording process. 
In this case, as with Hadley, the instrumental sections in question were created by a band 
member in response and counterpoint to a chord structure devised by the main songwriter of 
the group.
68
 
 
Abramson and Bamford have asserted that since copyright in a song exists from the time it is 
reproduced in a material form, the original demo version created by Brooker and Reid i.e. 
„the Song‟, was in fact the „original work‟ in the case. The released version of the song i.e. 
„the Work‟, which featured Fisher‟s organ solo, should therefore be regarded as an 
„arrangement‟ of the original „work‟. The commentators noted that the High Court judgment 
in Fisher did not appear to agree that the demo „version‟ of „A White Shade of Pale‟ was a 
„work‟ for the purpose of copyright. In fact the court appeared to consider the earlier version 
as a draft or something akin to that.
69
 This has been described as a „wrong‟ interpretation of 
the law by Abramson and Bamford.
70
  
                                                             
68 Interestingly, both „the Song‟, as apparently initially presented to the band members in demo form by Gary 
Brooker, and the organ solo featured in „the Work‟, which was devised by Matthew Fisher, were inspired and 
adapted to some extent from separate musical pieces originally composed by Bach i.e. musical works which 
reside in the public domain. Fisher v Brooker [2007] E.M.L.R. 9 at para. 36 
69 L. Abramson and T. Bamford of Harbottle & Lewis in the June 2008 edition of The In-House Lawyer, 42-43; 
accessible at http://www.harbottle.com/hnl/upload/documents/Music%20Copyright.pdf. See also comments of 
Blackburne J. in Fisher v Brooker [2007] E.M.L.R. 9 at para. 52-55. 
 In fact, as detailed further below, a number of licensing complexities could have arisen had 
Blackburne J. held that the work in question was the „arrangement‟ of Brooker‟s antecedent 
composition. It is possible that these licensing concerns may have influenced the decision of 
the court in finding that there was no antecedent „work‟.71 The arguments of Mr. Fisher‟s 
counsel, Mr Sutcliffe, were summarised by Blackburne J. in his judgment on this point: 
 
“He submitted that an approach whereby each musician contributing to the arrangement, 
provided his contribution is significant (i.e. non-trivial) and original, can share in the 
copyright of the arrangement gives rise to practical problems. Thus, if a work exists in 
multiple versions, each entitling its authors to share in the publishing royalties arising from 
the exploitation of that version, the work will require multiple registrations with the 
collecting societies and sophisticated monitoring to ensure that royalties are paid to the 
correct parties. Second, he said, if the author of the original work is not one of the arrangers, 
steps will have to be taken to ensure that a share of the arranger's copyright is paid to the 
owner of that original work. Third, he said, if all the band members are in principle entitled to 
a publishing royalty, the result will inevitably be a drastic paring down of the share of 
royalties payable to the writer and publisher of the original work, especially if there is a 
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71 Fisher v Brooker [2007] E.M.L.R. 9 at para. 52-58. See also A. Barron, „Introduction: Harmony or 
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multiplicity of versions. In those circumstances, he said, it was hardly surprising that this is 
not something to which writers and publishers have generally agreed.”72 
 
It is clear from the above argument that Mr. Sutcliffe considered that a finding that Matthew 
Fisher was actually a joint author of an „arrangement‟ would lead to huge difficulties in 
practice, in particular regarding the distribution of licensing royalties. Nonetheless, his 
statement arguably reflects the legal reality – „each musician contributing to the arrangement, 
provided his contribution is significant (i.e. non-trivial) and original, can share in the 
copyright of the arrangement‟.73  
 
Ultimately, in Blackburne J.‟s opinion Fisher was a joint author of „the Work‟.74 However in 
light of the above statement it is arguable that Blackburne J. sought to avoid dealing with the 
licensing complexities that would have arisen had he found that „the Work‟ was an 
arrangement of „the Song‟. As discussed below the Court of Appeal explicitly clarified this 
point, albeit without stating that Blackburne J. had erred in his finding. 
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Fisher v Brooker in the Court of Appeal – the Arrangement Clarification 
 
When judgment was handed down in the Court of Appeal, the court took the view that „the 
Work‟ was, definitively, an original copyright arrangement of the original copyright work 
referred to in the High Court judgment as „the Song‟.75 However Mummery L.J., giving the 
majority view, took this view without reference to the fact that the original trial judge, 
Blackburne J. did not correctly maintain the above distinction between „the Song‟ and „the 
Work‟ i.e. the underlying compositional work and the arrangement of that work. Mummery 
L.J. merely began his judgment with the presumption that „the Work‟ was an arrangement of 
„the Song‟ (which was also recognised as a „work‟ in itself).76 
 
Mummery L.J. also clarified the exact rights in question in the case. He made a clear 
distinction between the rights in „the Song‟ i.e. the underlying musical work, the rights in the 
„the Work‟ i.e. the arrangement‟ of that work, the rights in the eventual sound recording of 
the arrangement that was produced by the band, and the rights of the performers in relation to 
their performances on the recorded and released „A Whiter Shade of Pale‟. Mummery L.J. 
categorically stated that the case concerned the rights over „the Work‟77 i.e. the arrangement. 
It is clear that Mummery L.J. realised the full legal ramifications of recognising that „the 
Work‟ was an arrangement of „the Song‟.78 
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Crucially, in order for the arrangement to not amount to an infringement of the copyright in 
„the Song‟, „the Work‟ would need to have been correctly licensed by the copyright holders. 
In other words, once the Court of Appeal had correctly recognised that „the Work‟ was an 
arrangement, it became necessary and unavoidable for the court to deal adequately with the 
crucial licensing issues that sprung from this recognition. Interestingly, Mummery L.J. dealt 
with the complicated licensing difficulties that arose from the finding that „the work‟ was an 
arrangement by conveniently finding numerous implied licences which at various times 
involved the implied consent of Brooker, Fisher and Essex Music, and which covered the 
making of the arrangement and its subsequent exploitation. While the finding of these 
implied licences is arguably not a fait accompli, it is nonetheless arguable that the approach 
of Mummery L.J. is preferable to that of Blackburne J. on this issue, since Blackburne J. 
largely avoided the importance of the issue of licensing of arrangements.
79
 
 
It is hard not to conclude that there was a teleogical element to Mummery L.J.‟s reasoning in 
finding the implied licences.
 
For example, Mummery L.J. was clear that in his opinion a 
finding which resulted in „split‟ licensing rights was not in the interests of any of the parties 
involved, and he went on to emphasise that in finding that the implied licences existed, he 
was doing what was logical and necessary in light of the facts.
80
 For instance, a fundamental 
question in the case concerned whether there existed an implied licence between the owners 
of copyright in „the Song‟ and the makers of the arrangement known as „the Work‟ which 
allowed for the making of and exploitation of the arrangement. In light of the facts of the 
case, the court accepted that there was an implied licence from Essex Music that authorised 
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the creation of „the Work‟.81 It appears that Mummery L.J. relied on the „necessity‟ of the 
existence of the implied licence in order to find that the licence did in fact exist.
82
 However, it 
was also of crucial importance to the case to establish what exactly the effective terms of the 
licence were. On this point, the court found that in impliedly granting licence to make the 
arrangement, Essex Music were not attaching a condition that prevented Matthew Fisher 
from obtaining an interest in the jointly authored arrangement.
83
 However, Mummery L.J. 
also held that although Fisher was entitled to be recognised as author of the arrangement i.e. 
„the Work‟, he was not entitled to claim royalties as it was found that he had given an implied 
irrevocable licence to the defendants to exploit „the Work‟. This issue was appealed to the 
House of Lords, which ruled on point in 2009, as outlined below. 
 
The House of Lords – The Final Word on the Royalty Question 
 
The House of Lords in 2009
84
 reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal in relation to the 
royalty question, concluding that Matthew Fisher was entitled to royalties. However, on this 
point it has been noted that the House of Lords decision may have an effect on the type of 
royalties that Matthew Fisher can claim: 
 
“While judgment was given in favour of Fisher, the Law Lords' suggestion that the recording 
contract granted a royalty-free licence to Essex to exploit the song in the medium of the 
original recording takes some of the sheen off Fisher's victory. He will still be entitled to 
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royalty income from cover recordings and live performances, but, if the court is right, 
royalties from the song as it appears on the iconic first recording will be beyond his reach.”85 
 
Nonetheless, Baker and Lawson concluded that the case may have the effect of encouraging 
„a stream of vexatious lawsuits‟ taken by former pop band members and session musicians in 
the near future.
86
 With respect to the licensing of music within the industry, the Fisher saga is 
revealing in that with every judgment, from the High Cout to the House of Lords, a slightly 
different licensing arrangement was considered. From the High Court case it appeared that 
the court only recognised one copyright, „the Work‟, of which Matthew Fisher was a joint 
author. The High Court also acknowledged that he was potentially entitled to licensing 
royalties governing the work. The Court of Appeal however stated that Matthew Fisher was a 
joint author of the „arrangement‟, not the underlying composition, and furthermore the court 
held that he was not entitled to royalties for use of the arrangement because he had impliedly 
given a licence in this regard to the other relevant parties, Gary Brooker and Essex Music. 
Moreover, in the House of Lords, the court decided that Matthew Fisher was entitled to 
receive royalties for some of the rights concerning the „arrangement‟, but that he had granted 
a royalty-free licence to the other parties governing the rights to the arrangment on the 
original released sound recording. The fact that three varying interpretations were given to 
the licensing arrangements in the above judgments illustrates the complexity of the issue of 
licensing in this context. 
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Reconsidering the Role of Performers in the Music Industry – Should they be seen as 
‘Authors’ of Arrangements? 
 
It is quite possible that in the near future other „unsung‟ performers, session musicians and 
other musical contributors will make copyright claims regarding other famous hit songs of 
the past – songs that from a copyright perspective may actually be most accurately described 
as jointly authored „arrangements‟ distinct from the underlying musical works. Nonetheless, 
considering the fact that „performers‟ rights‟ has largely developed to compensate performers 
for the fact that they generally do not benefit from „authors‟ rights‟, is it now possible that 
some performers could end up with more rights than some composers? If this is the case, then 
the traditional music industry model has been slightly turned on its head. In fact, some 
performers i.e. those who can claim joint authorship of arrangements, could potentially begin 
to move towards the top of the revenue tree, with multiple streams of revenue coming from 
both performers‟ rights and copyright. A musician who is concurrently an arranger and 
performer would potentially be in a stronger position than a mere „performer‟.  
 
In light of this, the question arises as to whether it ought to be the case that performers are 
potentially seen as joint authors in return for their creative contributions. In other words, 
given the increasing scope and value of performers‟ rights in recent decades, should 
performers be able to claim a right over jointly authored arrangements as well?  
 
If copyright is envisaged as a way of encouraging and rewarding creativity in the musical 
context, copyright should surely encourage and reward the creative contributions of 
musicians in this way. Furthermore, it is these final arrangements that are released to the 
public, embodied in the original sound recordings, which are often the best and most valuable 
versions of the „songs‟. In fact, a particular musician‟s creative contribution may be the most 
recognisable part of a song, as was arguably the case with respect to the organ part in „A 
Whiter Shade of Pale‟, as described in Fisher. With this in mind, it seems fair that performers 
are entitled to be joint authors of the arrangements to which they add sufficient originality. 
 
Nonetheless, even if such a position is legally and morally justifiable, if it is the case that 
performers are often joint authors of arrangements, this clearly has significant potential 
consequences for licensing within the music industry. For example, a musician who is a joint 
author of an arrangement is entitled, as a joint author of the work, to a royalty both in relation 
to subsequent recorded cover versions of that particular arrangement, via mechanical rights, 
and with regard to subsequent performances of that particular arrangement, via performing 
rights. As previously stated, and acknowledged by the courts, this would appear to add 
several layers of complexity to the licensing system. Due to the fact that the subsequent cover 
version of the arrangement would be derivative of both the original composition and the 
particular arrangement, a licence would be required from both the composer of the original 
work, and the arranger of the arrangement of that work. If there are multiple joint authors of 
the arrangement, because a number of group members have added creative contributions, all 
the joint authors would need to license the work. For the licensee this would not necessarily 
result in a more complex procedure, since a blanket licence fee is typically available for both 
mechanical rights and performing rights. However, the complexities would become apparent 
when the rights are distributed by the collecting societies among both the copyright owner of 
the original composition, and the original arrangement. It has traditionally been the case that 
the composer has received the lion‟s share of this royalty revenue. However, if there are 
additional rights licensed over an original arrangement, the copyright owner of the 
arrangement copyright would also be due a royalty. 
 Some of these considerations are acknowledged in music industry practices. As previously 
noted, it is often the case that session musicians sign a musician‟s union contract stating that 
they are to receive a one-off fee rather than a royalty right resulting from their performances 
and contributions.
87
 Band members may also sign an agreement with the principal 
songwriters in the band covering such issues.
88
 However, in a case where there is no 
agreement otherwise between the members of a group, it would appear following the Fisher 
case that the de facto position is that a musician who adds sufficient originality to an existing 
composition during the performance and recording process will be a joint author of the 
resulting arrangement. Given the low threshold for originality, this is probably a more 
common occurrence than has traditionally been recognised in the music industry. It is no 
wonder that in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Fisher Mummery L.J. warned 
musicians to put their relationship to each other in writing before commencing recording.
89
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Conclusion 
 
Cases involving jointly authored arrangements potentially require courts to make difficult 
choices regarding how licensing revenue should be split in a case where a composition has 
been authored by one songwriter, but other members of a group have added creativity to the 
final recorded arrangement of the song. As discussed over the course of this article, the courts 
have not always decided these issues in a uniform way. However, despite the complexity that 
may arise, this article argues that the courts ought to be primarily guided by the tenets of 
copyright law, not by the traditional licensing practices of the music industry. These findings 
may in some cases lead to licensing considerations, and courts may have to stretch to find 
implied licences in order to take account of these considerations. Nonetheless, the way that 
licensing revenues are distributed is something for the music industry itself to deal with, not 
the courts. Furthermore, there has been much recent criticism of the collective licensing 
system
90
, and particularly the inability of the music collecting societies to adapt sufficiently 
to the digital age, if an overhaul of the collecting societies does take place in the near future, 
it might be useful for the societies to consider whether the system can be tweaked to make it 
more flexible and accessible to musicians and users, with the licensing of both compositions 
and arrangements in mind. 
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